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Abstract. Computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and combina-
torial auction design are much easier when bidders’ valuations satisfy the “gross substitutes” condition.
The goal of this paper is to evaluate rigorously the folklore belief that the main take-aways from these
results remain valid in settings where the gross substitutes condition holds only approximately. We show
that for valuations that pointwise approximate a gross substitutes valuation (in fact even a linear val-
uation), optimal social welfare cannot be approximated to within a subpolynomial factor and demand
oracles cannot be simulated using a subexponential number of value queries. We then provide several
positive results by imposing additional structure on the valuations (beyond gross substitutes), using a
more stringent notion of approximation, and/or using more powerful oracle access to the valuations.
For example, we prove that the performance of the greedy algorithm degrades gracefully for near-linear
valuations with approximately decreasing marginal values; that with demand queries, approximate wel-
fare guarantees for XOS valuations degrade gracefully for valuations that are pointwise close to XOS;
and that the performance of the Kelso-Crawford auction degrades gracefully for valuations that are
close to various subclasses of gross substitutes valuations.
1 Introduction
Welfare-maximization in combinatorial auctions is a central problem in both theory and practice,
and is perhaps the most well-studied problem in algorithmic game theory (e.g. [7]). The problem
is: given a set M of distinct items and descriptions of, or oracle access to, the valuation functions
v1, . . . , vn of n bidders (each a function from bundles to values), determine the partition S1, . . . , Sn
of items that maximizes the social welfare
∑n
i=1 vi(Si).
Many possibility and impossibility results for efficiently computing or approximating the maxi-
mum social welfare are known, as a function of the set of allowable bidder valuations. Very roughly,
the current state of affairs can be summarized by a trichotomy: (i) when the valuations satisfy “gross
substitutes,” then exact welfare-maximization is easy; (ii) when the valuations are “complement-
free” but not necessarily gross substitutes (e.g., submodular), exact welfare-maximization is hard
but constant-factor approximations are possible; and (iii) with sufficiently general valuations, even
approximate welfare-maximization is hard.3
The rule of thumb that “substitutes are easy, complements are hard” has its origins in the eco-
nomic literature on multi-item auction design. For example, simple and natural ascending auctions
converge to a welfare-maximizing Walrasian equilibrium (i.e., to a market-clearing price vector and
allocation) whenever all bidders’ valuations satisfy gross substitutes, but when this condition is
violated a Walrasian equilibrium does not generally exist [22,17,27]. Similarly, the VCG mechanism
has a number of desirable properties (like revenue monotonicity) when bidders’ valuations satisfy
gross substitutes, but not in general otherwise [1].
Thus both computational and economic results suggest that social welfare maximization and
combinatorial auction design are much easier when bidders’ valuations satisfy the gross substitutes
? This work is supported by the I-CORE Program of the Planning and Budgeting Committee (PBC) and the Israel
Science Foundation (grant number 4/11), and by NSF grants CCF-1215965 and CCF-1524062.
3 “Gross substitutes” states that a bidder’s demand for an item can only increase as prices of other items are
increased; see Section 2 for a formal definition.
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condition. More generally, in settings with both substitutes and complements, the folklore belief in
the field is that simple auction formats should produce allocations with near-optimal social welfare
if and only if the substitutes component is in some sense “dominant.”4 For over twenty years, there
has been a healthy (and high-stakes) debate over whether or not the ideal case of gross substitutes
valuations should guide combinatorial auction design in realistic settings.5
The goal of this paper is to evaluate rigorously the folklore belief that the main take-aways from
the study of gross substitutes valuations remain valid in settings where the condition holds only
approximately.
The motivation for this work is further strengthened by the recent interest in data-driven op-
timization [40,18,4]. In general, in order to optimize an objective (in our case social welfare) in a
real-world setting, a model must first be formulated, and its parameters (in our case valuations)
must be learned from the available data. The estimated model is only an approximation of the true
setting, and may exhibit arbitrary errors introduced by the learning techniques. For this reason,
there has been much recent interest in the learning community in optimization of functions that
can be only be evaluated approximately [5,10], and of functions for which “nice” properties such
as submodularity hold only approximately [24].6 By the same token, as market and mechanism
design become more data-driven, it is important to understand the possibilities and impossibilities
of welfare optimization under estimation errors that cause the gross substitutes condition to hold
only approximately.
1.1 Our Results
We first consider arguably the most natural notion of “approximate gross substitute valuations,”
namely valuations that are pointwise within a 1+ factor of some gross substitutes valuation. Do the
laudable properties of gross substitutes valuations degrade gracefully as  increases? At this level of
generality, the answer is negative: even for valuations that are pointwise close to linear valuations,
we prove that the social welfare cannot be approximated to within a subpolynomial factor using a
subexponential number of value queries, and that demand oracles cannot be approximated in any
useful sense by a subexponential number of value queries. When the gross substitutes condition
holds exactly, a demand query can be implemented using a polynomial number of value queries
(see [34]), and the welfare-maximization problem can be solved exactly with a polynomial number
of such queries (see [32]). We conclude that there is no sweeping generalization of the properties
of gross substitutes valuations to approximations of such valuations, and that any positive result
must impose additional structure on the valuations (beyond gross substitutes), use a more stringent
notion of approximation, and/or use more powerful oracle access to the valuations.
We next consider positive results in the value oracle model. Our main result here is a proof that
the (optimal) performance of the greedy algorithm degrades gracefully for valuations that are close
to linear functions, provided these valuations are also approximately submodular (in a stronger
than pointwise sense). (As noted above, some assumption beyond near-linearity is necessary for
any positive result.) The standard arguments for proving approximation bounds for the greedy
algorithm (e.g. [25]) do not imply this result, and we develop a new analysis for this purpose.
4 For example, [8] write: “In general, synergies across license valuations complicate the auction design process.
Theory suggests that a ‘simple’ (i.e., non-combinatorial) auction will have difficulty in assigning licenses efficiently
in such an environment.”
5 For example, [2] write: “A contentious issue in the design of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
auctions of personal communications services (PCS) licenses concerned the importance of synergies. If large syner-
gies are prevalent among the licenses being offered, then the simultaneous ascending auction mechanism the FCC
adopted, which does not permit all-or-nothing bids on sets of licenses, might be expected to perform poorly.”
6 An orthogonal line of research studies approximately learning functions with “nice” properties [3].
We then consider welfare-maximization with demand oracles,7 and find that welfare guarantees
tend to be more robust in this model. First, the value of optimal social welfare can be approximated
using demand queries within a factor of γC + , whenever the valuations are pointwise -close to a
class C such that the integrality gap of the “configuration LP” is γC . Since the configuration LP
is the primary vehicle for developing approximation algorithms in the demand oracle model, we
recover pointwise robustness essentially for all known approximation results in the demand oracle
model (in terms of the optimal value). Another question, though, is whether an allocation achieving
good welfare can be found in a computationally-efficient way. For some classes of valuations, we
show that this is possible (and thus we achieve a (1 − )-approximation for valuations -close to
linear, and a (1− 1/e− )-approximation for valuations -close to XOS). We remark that no extra
assumption of near-submodularity is required here; this highlights another difference between the
value and demand oracle models.
Another approach to finding an optimal allocation assuming the gross substitutes property is
the Kelso-Crawford algorithm, also known as the taˆtonnement procedure. In general, this procedure
requires demand queries and thus also falls within the umbrella of the demand oracle model. Here we
show that the performance of the Kelso-Crawford algorithm degrades smoothly for certain classes of
functions, namely for valuations close to linear, close to unit-demand with {0, 1} values, and more
generally close to transversal valuations (rank functions of a partition matroid). Unfortunately
the Kelso-Crawford algorithm is not going to be a universally robust solution for general gross
substitutes, either. As we show, its performance degrades discontinuously for valuations close to
unit-demand (with unrestricted values), a seemingly minor extension of the cases above where we
showed positive results.
In addition we show a counterexample to an approach based on Murota’s cycle canceling al-
gorithm, the remaining known way to solve the welfare-maximization problem under the gross
substitutes property.
In summary, the idea that approximation guarantees for various classes of valuations should
degrade gracefully under small deviations from the class should be viewed with skepticism. Our
negative results do not imply that that the folklore belief that “close to substitutes is easy” is
wrong, but they do imply that there is no “generic reason” for why this might be the case. Our
positive results show that robust guarantees can still be obtained in certain cases, but typically this
requires additional care and often new ideas on top of known techniques.
1.2 Related Work and Organization
Valuation functions. There are several increasingly-restrictive classes of valuations studied in the
literature that may be considered “free from complements”, including subadditive, XOS, submodu-
lar and gross substitutes valuations. Beginning with [25], the algorithmic game theory literature has
extensively studied submodular valuations and the hierarchy of their superclasses; recently there
has been growing interest in the gross substitutes subclass as well [34,19,35].
Welfare maximization. The study of welfare maximization for gross substitutes has a deep
mathematical and algorithmic basis. Even the case of unit-demand valuations subsumes the bipar-
tite matching problem, for which classic combinatorial and linear programming techniques were
developed (see, e.g., [37]). In the general case, the main techniques for gross substitutes include
ascending-price auctions [22], combinatorial cycle canceling algorithms based on discrete convexity
[30,31], and linear programming [6,32] (see also [34,35]).
7 As noted above, with valuations that only satisfy gross substitutes approximately, demand oracles are substantially
more powerful than value oracles.
For submodular valuations, exact welfare maximization is hard and so research efforts have con-
centrated on approximation. A 2-approximation can be achieved greedily [25], and the best approx-
imation algorithm in the value oracle model (continuous greedy) achieves a (1−1/e)-approximation
[43], which is optimal [23]. In the demand query model, a 2-approximation can be achieved via an
ascending-price auction [16], and the 1− 1/e barrier can be broken [14].
Welfare maximization under deviations. Not much previous work has studied the extent to
which approximate welfare-maximization guarantees approximately hold under small deviations
from the valuation class. The closest result to our work is a theorem of [18], who show that one
cannot achieve a constant-factor approximation when maximizing valuations that are pointwise -
close to submodular (in the sense of our Definition 1).8 Our Proposition 3 strengthens this negative
result to apply even to valuations that are close to linear. For related work on information-theoretic
lower bounds (in the context of submodular optimization) see, e.g., [29,36].
We now survey other related work, that differs from ours in the model of deviation, the valuation
classes considered, and/or the algorithmic questions it focuses on. Hassidim and Singer [18] also
study the problem of welfare maximization with submodular valuations and random (rather than
adversarial) noise. Milgrom [28] introduces a metric for distance from a matroid rank function, in
terms of distance to the matroid’s linear constraints; the algorithmic setting is different from ours
since the players are single-parameter subject to a single feasibility constraint, rather than part of a
combinatorial auction setting. Feige et al. [13] study, and unify previous results on, deviations from
submodularity that are captured by a graphical representation. Maehara and Murota [26] adopt a
heuristic approach (not guaranteed to converge) based on Murota’s cycle canceling algorithm, and
test how well it performs in experiments for subclasses of submodular valuations.
It is interesting to compare our work to that of [21], who study divisible items with budgets
rather than indivisible items with quasi-linear utilities. They define an approximate weak gross
substitutes property for which the Garg-Kapoor auction ensures that each player approximately
gets his demand (in a different sense than our notion of approximate demand, as formulated below
in Definition 5, Inequality (5)). Their conclusion that “markets do not suddenly become intractable
if they slightly violate the weak gross substitutes property” is therefore quite different from ours,
showing an intriguing discrepancy between the models.
Organization. After introducing the preliminaries in Section 2, Section 3 presents two cautionary
tales as to what can go wrong when simple valuations undergo smalls perturbations. We then estab-
lish positive results in the value oracle model (Section 4) and in the demand oracle model (Section
5), and conclude with some open questions in Section 6. We defer some proofs to Appendices A–C,
as well as our negative examples for specific algorithms (Appendix D).
2 Preliminaries
Combinatorial Auctions: Model and Notation. A combinatorial auction setting (or market)
includes a set of n players N and a set of m indivisible items M . We call a subset S ⊆M of items
a bundle. For an ordered set of items S = (s1, s2, . . . , sk) and for j ∈ [k], we use the notation Sj to
denote the “prefix” subset {s1, . . . sj−1} of items that appear before sj (in particular, S1 = ∅).
Every player i has a valuation vi : 2
M → R+ over bundles. Every valuation v is assumed to be
monotone unless stated otherwise, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ) for every two bundles S ⊆ T . Valuations are
not necessarily normalized, i.e., v(∅) is not always equal to zero (normalization is not without loss
8 The model in [18] is that of erroneous value oracles, which return values v˜(S) close to an underlying submodular
function v(S). This is equivalent to our Definition 1, as we might as well assume that v˜(S) is the true valuation.
of generality in our model of perturbation). For every two bundles S, T we denote by v(S | T ) the
marginal value of S given T , which is equal to V (S ∪ T )− v(T ).
An allocation S is a (possibly partial) partition of the items in M into n bundles S1, . . . , Sn,
where bundle Si is the allocation of player i. A full allocation is an allocation in which every item
is allocated. The social efficiency of an allocation S is measured by its welfare W (S) = ∑ni=1 vi(Si).
A price vector p ∈ Rm+ is a vector of item prices, one per item. For every bundle S we denote
by p(S) the aggregate price
∑
j∈S p(j) of the bundle. Given a price vector p, each player wishes
to maximize his quasi-linear utility, i.e., to receive a bundle S maximizing vi(S)− p(S) among all
possible bundles (including the empty one). A utility-maximizing bundle is said to be in demand
for the player given the price vector p. If the player is already allocated a bundle T , then he wishes
to add to his allocation a bundle S ⊆ (M \T ) maximizing vi(S | T )− p(S), and we say that S is in
his demand given p and T . A bundle S is individually rational (IR) for a player i if vi(S) ≥ p(S);
it is strongly IR if every subset T ⊆ S is IR for i.
A full allocation S and price vector p form a Walrasian equilibrium if for every player i, Si is in
i’s demand given p. By the first welfare theorem, the equilibrium allocation S maximizes welfare.
Since valuations are in general of exponential size in m, the standard assumption is that they
are accessed via value oracles, which return the value of any bundle upon query. In Sections 3.2 and
5 we discuss demand oracles, which given a price vector p, return a bundle in the player’s demand
given p. In this case we allow p to include negative prices so that a demand oracle will also be able
to return a bundle in the player’s demand given a previous allocation T .
Valuation Classes. We define several valuation classes of interest. A valuation ` is linear if there
exists a vector (l1, . . . , lm) ≥ 0 and a scalar c ≥ 0 such that `(S) = c+
∑
j∈S lj for every bundle S;
it is additive if c = 0. A valuation r is unit-demand if there exists a vector (ρ1, . . . , ρm) ≥ 0 such
that r(S) = maxj∈S ρj for every bundle S.
LetM = (M, I) be a matroid over the ground set of items M , where I is the family of feasible
bundles.9 A maximal feasible set is called a basis, and the matroid rank function maps bundles to
the cardinality of their largest feasible subset. Given a vector (w1, . . . , wm) ≥ 0 of item weights, the
corresponding weighted rank function maps bundles to the weight of their heaviest feasible subset.
A valuation r is an unweighted (resp., weighted) matroid rank function if there exists a matroid
M such that r is its (weighted) rank function. Both linear and unit-demand valuations are types
of weighted matroid rank functions.
A valuation v is gross substitutes if for every two price vectors p ≤ q, for every bundle S in
demand given p, there exists a bundle T in demand given q, which contains every item j ∈ S for
which q(j) = p(j).10 A valuation v is submodular if for every two bundles S ⊆ T and item j /∈ T ,
v(j | S) ≥ v(j | T ), i.e., the marginal value of j is decreasing. A valuation v is XOS (also known as
fractionally subadditive) if there exist additive valuations a1, a2, . . . such that v(S) = maxk ak(S)
for every bundle S. It is well-known that gross substitutes ⊂ submodular ⊂ XOS.
Algorithmic Approaches to Welfare-Maximization. Finding a welfare-maximizing alloca-
tion in combinatorial auctions is computationally tractable for gross substitutes. There are three
main algorithmic approaches: (1) auction-based, (2) LP-based, and (3) combinatorial. For linear
valuations there is also (4) the greedy approach. The first two approaches use demand queries and
9 A set system M = (M, I) is a matroid if the following properties hold: (i) I is non-empty; (ii) I is downward-
closed, that is, if S ⊆ T and T ∈ I then S ∈ I; (iii) for every S, T ∈ I such that |S| < |T |, there exists t ∈ T \ S
such that S ∪ {t} ∈ I (see, e.g., [33]).
10 The intuition behind this definition will become clearer once we define the Kelso-Crawford algorithm below.
run in polynomial time, while the latter two use value queries and run in strongly-polynomial time.
We describe here Approaches (1) and (4) in more detail; see also Appendix A.
In each round of the Kelso-Crawford algorithm, one player (chosen arbitrarily) adds to his
existing allocation a bundle in his demand, taking into account his current allocation (and a δ-
increase in the prices of items not currently in his allocation). The algorithm terminates only when
no player wants to add to his current allocation. For completeness, a full description appears in
Algorithm 1 in Appendix A.
Proposition 1 ([22]). For gross substitutes valuations, Algorithm 1 converges to a (welfare-maximizing)
Walrasian equilibrium as δ → 0.
The proof of Proposition 1 relies on the definition of gross substitutes, by which at any point
in the algorithm, every player’s allocation is a subset of some bundle in his demand.
Algorithm 2 in Appendix A formally describes the greedy algorithm for finding a value-maximizing
bundle subject to a feasibility constraint I on the bundles; this is a problem to which welfare-
maximization is well-known to reduce (see Proof of Corollary 2). I is simply a family of feasible
bundles.11 The greedy algorithm starts with an empty bundle, and in each iteration adds the item
with maximum marginal value among all items that maintain feasibility, breaking ties arbitrarily.
Proposition 2 ([15]). If v is linear and the feasibility constraint I is such that the set system
M = (M, I) is a matroid, then Algorithm 2 is optimal.
3 Two Cautionary Tales
Do the nice properties of a valuation class degrade gracefully as one moves outside the class? This
section describes two cautionary tales demonstrating that the answer can subtly depend on the
notion of “being close,” on the tractable class under consideration, and on the model of access to
the valuations.
Arguably the most natural general notion of “closeness” is pointwise.12
Definition 1. A valuation v˜ is -close to submodular (or linear, gross substitutes, etc.), if there is
a submodular (or linear, gross substitutes, etc.) valuation v such that v(S) ≤ v˜(S) ≤ (1 + )v(S)
for all bundles S.
3.1 Close-to-additive vs. Close-to-linear Valuations
We next show that approximate welfare-maximization is hard for valuations that are -close to
linear (a restrictive subclass of gross substitutes valuations).
Proposition 3. Given value oracles for valuations -close to linear, no algorithm using a subexpo-
nential number of queries can approximate the value of optimal social welfare within a factor better
than polynomial in m,n.
Proof. Let |M | = m = an and let (A1, A2, . . . , An) be a random partition of M such that |Ai| = a.
We define linear valuations as follows:
`i(S) = +
1
a
|S ∩Ai|.
11 Since it can be exponential in size we assume it is given by an oracle which returns whether a bundle is feasible or
not.
12 We use relative error in the interests of scale-invariance (the ”units” in which valuations are specified do not
matter). Absolute additive error is not interesting for the problems that we study.
We also define
wi(S) = (1 + )+
1
an
|S|.
Note that if we do not know the partition (A1, . . . , An), which is randomized, `i(S) will be close to
its expectation which is wi(S). Let us define the following valuations vi:
– If
∣∣|S ∩Ai| − 1n |S|∣∣ ≤ 2a, then vi(S) = wi(S).
– If
∣∣|S ∩Ai| − 1n |S|∣∣ > 2a, then vi(S) = `i(S).
Note that in the first case, we have vi(S) ≥ (1 + ) + 1a(|S ∩ Ai| − 2a) = `i(S) and vi(S) ≤
(1 + )+ 1a(|S ∩Ai|+ 2a) ≤ (1 + 2)+ 1a |S ∩Ai| ≤ (1 + 2)`i(S). So vi is 2-close to `i.
By Chernoff bounds, for a fixed query S, the probability that
∣∣|S∩Ai|− 1n |S|∣∣ > 2a is e−Ω(4a).
Hence, with high probability we are always in the first case above, the returned value depends only
on |S| and hence the algorithm does not learn any information about Ai. Therefore (by standard
arguments), it would require exponentially many queries to find any set such that
∣∣|S∩Ai|− 1n |S|∣∣ >
a and hence distinguish whether the input valuations are vi or wi.
The optimal solution under vi is Si = Ai which gives welfare
∑n
i=1 vi(Ai) >
1
a
∑n
i=1 |Ai| = n,
while the optimal welfare under wi is (1 + )n+ 1. So the approximation factor cannot be better
than (1 + )+ 1n .
Note that we can set  = 1/a1/4−δ = (n/m)1/4−δ and the high probability statements still hold.
Therefore, we can push the hardness factor to max{(n/m)1/4−δ, 1/n}. uunionsq
This hardness result relies strongly on the value oracle model — things are quite different in
the demand oracle model, as we discuss in Section 3.2 below.
Proposition 3 is a startling contrast to the case of valuations that are -close to additive val-
uations, which differ only by requiring the empty set to have value 0. Here, approximate welfare-
maximization is easy.
Proposition 4. Welfare-maximization can be solved within a factor of 1 +  for -close to additive
valuations.
Proof. An additive valuation has the form v(S) =
∑
j∈S aj . By assumption, aj ≤ v({j}) ≤ (1+)aj
for every singleton j. Hence we can determine the coefficients aj within a factor of 1 +  and run
welfare maximization on the resulting additive functions. Each item simply goes to the highest
bidder, and we lose a factor of at most 1 +  due to the errors in determining aj . uunionsq
The proof of Proposition 4 makes the more general point that, whenever the approximating
“nice” valuation v˜ can be (approximately) recovered from the given valuation v, then welfare
approximation guarantees carry over (applying an off-the-shelf approximation algorithm to the
valuations v˜). As Proposition 3 makes clear, however, in many cases it is not possible to efficiently
reconstruct an approximating “nice” valuation, even under the promise that such a valuation exists.
3.2 Value Queries vs. Demand Queries
One remarkable property of gross substitutes valuations is that there is no difference between
the value oracle and demand oracle models: Demand queries can be simulated efficiently by value
queries (via the greedy algorithm), and hence any algorithm in the demand oracle model can also
be implemented in the value oracle model ([34] and references within). Unfortunately, this is no
longer true for valuations that are -close to gross substitutes, or even -close to linear.
Proposition 5. Given a value oracle to a valuation -close to linear, answering demand queries
requires an exponential number of value queries.
This can be proved by a construction similar to the one above. However, let us instead present
an indirect argument which shows even a little bit more.
Lemma 1. For any class of valuations C such that the integrality gap of the configuration LP is
γ ≥ 1, it is possible to estimate the optimal social welfare within a multiplicative factor of (1 + )γ
for valuations that are -close to C in the demand oracle model.
Proof. Consider the configuration LP:
max
∑n
i=1
∑
S⊆[m] vi(S)xi,S :
∀j ∈ [m]; ∑ni=1∑S:j∈S xi,S ≤ 1,
∀i ∈ [n]; ∑S⊆[m] xi,S = 1,
xi,S ≥ 0.
Let us denote by LP(v) and OPT(v) the LP optimum and optimal social welfare, respectively,
under valuations v. The assumption is that for valuations v ∈ C, OPT(v) ≤ LP(v) ≤ γ ·OPT(v).
Let us solve the LP for valuations v˜ that are pointwise -close to valuations v ∈ C. (This is possible
since we assume that we have demand oracles for v˜, which gives a separation oracle for the dual;
see [32].) We have vi(S) ≤ v˜i(S) ≤ (1 + )vi(S) for each i and S. Therefore, the same inequalities
hold for the LP optimum as well as optimal social welfare, and we obtain
OPT(v˜) ≤ LP(v˜) ≤ (1 + ) LP(v) ≤ (1 + )γ ·OPT(v) ≤ (1 + )γ ·OPT(v˜).
Since the configuration LP is known to be integral for gross substitutes valuations (see e.g. [42]),
we obtain the following.
Corollary 1. For valuations -close to gross substitutes, it is possible to estimate the optimal social
welfare to within a multiplicative factor of 1 +  in the demand oracle model.
This implies Proposition 5: a simulation of demand queries would allow us to approximate
social welfare within 1 +  for valuations -close to gross substitutes and as a special case -close to
linear. We know from Proposition 3 that this (and even much weaker approximations) would require
exponentially many value queries. Actually we obtain a stronger statement: It is not possible to
answer demand queries via value queries for -close to linear valuations even approximately, under
any notion of approximation that would be useful for approximating the optimal social welfare.
This is because, again, such a simulation would lead to a (1 + )-approximation of social welfare
via value queries, which Proposition 3 rules out.
4 Positive Results for Restricted Valuation Classes
Motivated by the hardness results in the previous section for valuations -close to linear in the
value oracle model, this section considers stronger notions of closeness. In Section 4.1 we discuss
“marginal” closeness including the notion of α-submodularity. In Section 4.2 we analyze the greedy
algorithm for valuations that are α-submodular in addition to being -close to linear.
4.1 Marginal Closeness
Recall that a pointwise approximation approximates the outputs of a valuation as a discrete func-
tion. A natural way to strengthen this is to approximate the behavior of the valuation’s discrete
derivatives, or marginal values. The marginal value v(j | ·) of every item j can be viewed as a
set function, and together these set functions encode important properties of the valuation. For
example, linear valuations can be characterized as valuations for which the marginal of every item
is a constant function; submodular valuations can be characterized as valuations for which the
marginal of every item is a non-increasing function;13 and unweighted matroid rank functions can
be characterized as valuations for which the marginal of every item is a non-increasing zero-one
function [38].
We remark that even without any strengthening, pointwise -closeness has the following useful
implication regarding the “closeness” of the marginal values of bundles:
Observation 1 For every valuation v that is -close to a valuation v′, and for every two bundles
S, T ⊆M ,
v′(S | T )− v′(T ) ≤ v(S | T ) ≤ v′(S | T ) + v′(S ∪ T ). (1)
Proof. By the definition of -closeness, v(S | T ) = v(S ∪ T ) − v(T ) ≥ v′(S ∪ T ) − (1 + )v′(T ) =
v′(S | T )− v′(T ). The upper bound follows similarly. uunionsq
Observation 1 will be useful in proving our positive results in Sections 4.2 and 5.2. Yet the
guarantee in (1) is relatively weak: the “error terms” depend on v′(T ) or v′(S∪T ), and so can be large
if these terms are large. We now define the stronger notion of marginal pointwise approximation:14
Definition 2. A valuation v is marginal--close to a class C of marginals (constant, non-increasing,
etc.), if for every item j the corresponding marginal value function v(j | ·) is (pointwise) -close to
a function gj ∈ C.
Let us now see what properties follow from this definition.
The Property of α-Submodularity. Consider first the class of valuations that are marginal--
close to decreasing. This coincides with the previously-studied class of α-submodular valuations –
a strict super-class of submodular valuations:
Definition 3 ([25]). Let α ≥ 1. A valuation v is α-submodular if for every two bundles S ⊆ T
and item j /∈ T , αv(j | S) ≥ v(j | T ).
Observation 2 A valuation v is marginal--close to the class of decreasing functions if and only
if it is (1 + )-submodular.
Proof. For every S ⊆ T and j /∈ T , let gj be the decreasing function to which v(j|·) is -close. Then
(1 + )v(j|S) ≥ (1 + )gj(S) ≥ (1 + )gj(T ) ≥ v(j|T ), showing that v is (1 + )-submodular. The
converse follows from Observation 7 in Appendix B. uunionsq
Lehmann et al. [25] show that valuations which are α-submodular have welfare guarantees
similar to those of submodular valuations. This is in stark contrast to the hardness of sub-polynomial
approximation for valuations that are only pointwise -close to submodular [18].
13 Since for every j and S ⊆ T , v(j | S) ≥ v(j | T ).
14 Equivalent to having erroneous access to the marginal values via an oracle [9].
Our positive result in Section 4.2 is for -close to linear valuations that are also α-submodular.
Note that the submodularity assumption is a standard one in the context of algorithmic game
theory (as justified by [25]), and that α-submodularity is a strictly weaker assumption. We next
show that -close to linear, α-submodular valuations subsume an interesting subclass.
An Interesting Special Case: Bounded Curvature. Consider the class of valuations that are
marginal--close to the constant (marginal) functions. It is not hard to see that this includes the
class of submodular valuations with bounded curvature.
Definition 4 ([11,41]). A valuation v has curvature c ∈ [0, 1] if for every item j and bundle S
such that j /∈ S, v(j | S) ≥ (1− c)v(j | ∅).
The bounded curvature property of submodular functions was introduced by [11], and has
recently received much attention in the optimization and learning communities (see, e.g., [39] and
references within). Sviridenko et al. [41] design an approximation algorithm for such valuations
with the best-possible approximation factor in terms of its dependence on the curvature parameter.
We observe the following (the proof appears in Appendix B):
Observation 3 An α-submodular valuation v with curvature c is α−1+c1−c -close to a linear valuation.
Thus the class of α-submodular valuations that are -close to linear contains as a special case
of interest α-submodular valuations with bounded curvature.
4.2 The Greedy Algorithm
Recall that the greedy algorithm (Algorithm 2) is optimal for linear valuations. In this section we
prove the following “robustness” theorem for this algorithm; the implication for welfare maximiza-
tion is stated in Corollary 2.
Theorem 4. Let v be an α-submodular valuation that is -close to a linear valuation `. Let M =
(M, I) be a matroid of rank k (represented by an independence oracle). The greedy algorithm returns
an independent set S ∈ I such that v(S) ≥ 1−3α v(S∗), where S∗ ∈ arg maxI⊆I v(I).
Corollary 2. In a market with α-submodular valuations v1, . . . , vn that are -close to linear val-
uations `1, . . . , `n, there is a polynomial time algorithm with value access that finds an allocation
with 1−3α -approximately optimal welfare.
Proof. As in [25], we define a valuation v over player-item pairs, such that for a set S of such pairs,
v(S) =
∑
i vi(Si) where Si is the set of items paired with player i in S. We show that v is also
α-submodular and -close to linear: It is -close to linear since
∑
i `i(Si) ≤ v(S) ≤ (1 + )
∑
i `i(Si),
and the sum of linear valuations is linear. It is α-submodular since for every S ⊆ T and (i, j) /∈ T ,
αv((i, j) | S) = αvi(j | Si) ≥ vi(j | Ti) = v((i, j), T ). The proof follows by applying Theorem 4 to v
and to the partition matroid M over player-item pairs, which allows each item to be paired with
no more than one player. uunionsq
Proof Idea. Before we turn to the proof of Theorem 4, we highlight the difference between our
analysis in this proof and the standard analysis of the greedy algorithm. Often the analysis of greedy
is item by item (see, e.g., [25]), showing that greedily choosing the next item maintains the optimal
value up to a small error. However this does not seem to prove a good approximation factor in our
case, because of the distortion caused by the pointwise errors. For example, greedy may choose to
include an item j from the optimal solution, but at the particular point it is included, its marginal
value may not be high relative to its linear contribution (recall the error term in the marginal value
as shown in Observation 1). This suggests analyzing multiple items at a time in order for the error
terms to average out. Indeed, we split the items chosen by greedy into two sets – those shared with
the optimal solution and the rest – and analyze each set as a whole in order to establish the claimed
approximation ratio.
The following lemma (whose proof appears in Appendix B) relates the sum of marginals to
the linear contribution, and is applied in the proof of Theorem 4. Recall that v is -close to the
linear valuation `, and that for an ordered set of items X = (x1, x2, . . . , xk), Xj denotes the prefix
{x1, . . . xj−1}.
Lemma 2. Let X and Z be two disjoint sets. X is ordered and has mX items. Let Y1, . . . , YmX be
sets such that Yj ⊆ Xj ∪ Z for every j. Then
α
mX∑
j=1
v(xj | Yj) ≥
mX∑
j=1
`(xj)− `(Z).
Proof (Theorem 4).
Denote by S the independent set that greedy returns given the valuation v and matroid M,
ordered by the order in which the items were greedily added. Denote by S∗ an independent set
with optimal value v(S∗) subject to the matroid constraint. Due to monotonicity we can assume
without loss of generality that the sizes of both S and S∗ are k, i.e., that both sets are bases.
Let P = {j | sj ∈ S ∩ S∗} be the positions in S of the items that also appear in S∗, and let Q
be the remaining positions in S. Order S∗ such that the items in S ∩ S∗ are in positions P . The
rest of the items in S∗ are ordered among the remaining positions in S∗ in the following way: By
the exchange property of matroids, there exists a bijection f from S \ S∗ to S∗ \ S, such that for
every position j ∈ Q, S \ {sj} ∪ {f(sj)} is independent [38]. For every j ∈ Q we set s∗j = f(sj).
This ensures that s∗j can be added to Sj without violating feasibility. We use the notation S(P ) and
S(Q) for the set of items in S in positions P and Q, respectively; similarly for S∗(P ) and S∗(Q).
By the definition of greedy, and because adding s∗j to Sj maintains feasibility for every j ∈ Q,
it holds that v(sj | Sj) ≥ v(s∗j | Sj) for every j ∈ [k]. Thus
v(S) ≥ v(∅) +
∑
j∈P
v(sj | Sj) +
∑
j∈Q
v(s∗j | Sj). (2)
We now invoke Lemma 2 twice. By Lemma 2 instantiated with X = S∗(Q) and Z = S (note
these are indeed disjoint), and using that Sj ⊆ S, we get that
α
∑
j∈Q
v(s∗j | Sj) ≥
∑
j∈Q
`(s∗j )− `(S). (3)
By Lemma 2 instantiated with X = S(P ) and Z = S(Q) (these are also disjoint), and using that
Sj ⊆ S(Q) ∪ {sp1 , . . . , spj−1}, we get that
α
∑
j∈P
v(sj | Sj) ≥
∑
j∈P
`(sj)− `(S) =
∑
j∈P
`(s∗j )− `(S). (4)
Combining (2), (3) and (4), we get that αv(S) ≥ αv(∅) +∑kj=1 `(s∗j )− 2`(S). Since v is -close
to ` and S∗ is optimal for v, `(S) ≤ v(S) ≤ v(S∗). Again using v’s closeness to `, αv(∅) ≥ αc ≥ c.
Putting these together we get that αv(S) ≥ `(S∗) − 2v(S∗) ≥ v(S∗)/(1 + ) − 2v(S∗) ≥ (1 −
3)v(S∗), as required. uunionsq
5 The Demand Oracle Model
5.1 Rounding the Configuration LP
By Lemma 1 and Corollary 1 we already know that estimation of the optimal welfare is possible in
this model in polynomial time via the configuration LP. Another question is whether we can also
find an allocation of corresponding value, given a fractional solution of the configuration LP. We
observe that in some cases, existing rounding techniques yield the result that we want. Note that
the following proposition does not assume submodularity.
Proposition 6. For combinatorial auctions in the demand oracle model, there is a polynomial time
algorithm that finds:
• A (1− )-approximately optimal allocation, if the valuations are -close to linear;
• A (1 − 1/e − )-approximately optimal allocation, if the valuations are -close to XOS (or in
particular -close to submodular).
Proof. We solve the configuration LP using demand queries. Let v˜i denote the true valuations and
vi the linear/XOS valuations that the v˜i are close to.
In the case of valuations close to linear, we round the fractional solution by allocating each
item j to player i with probability yij =
∑
S:j∈S xi,S . Call the resulting random sets Ri. For the
underlying linear valuations vi, it is clearly the case that E[vi(Ri)] =
∑
S xi,Svi(S). Therefore,∑
i
E[v˜i(Ri)] ≥
∑
i
E[vi(Ri)] =
∑
i,S
xi,Svi(S) ≥ 1
1 + 
LP(v˜i) ≥ (1− ) OPT .
For valuations close to XOS, we allocate a set S tentatively to player i with probability xi,S , and
then we use the contention resolution technique to resolve conflicts [12,14]. This technique has the
property that conditioned on requesting an item j, a player receives it with conditional probability
at least 1−1/e. Denote by Ri the random set that player i receives after contention resolution. Using
the fractional subadditivity of XOS functions, we obtain that E[vi(Ri)] ≥ (1 − 1/e)
∑
S xi,Svi(S).
Hence, similarly to the case above,∑
i
E[v˜i(Ri)] ≥
∑
i
E[vi(Ri)] ≥ (1− 1/e)
∑
i,S
xi,Svi(S) ≥ 1− 1/e
1 + 
LP(v˜i) ≥ (1− 1/e− ) OPT .
5.2 Positive Results for Kelso-Crawford
The Kelso-Crawford algorithm (Algorithm 1) uses demand queries in order to find, in each iter-
ation, the items to add to a player’s existing bundle. In this section we show that it can work
well for markets in which the valuations are submodular and -close to simple subclasses of gross
substitutes. In particular, it finds an allocation and a price vector such that the allocation achieves
approximately optimal welfare, and the price vector can be interpreted as approximately stabi-
lizing (in a sense made precise below). We can also relax submodularity as long as we maintain
approximately decreasing marginals.
Remark 1. For simplicity, our analysis of the Kelso-Crawford algorithm shall treat prices as if
raised continuously rather than discretely. This means that the approximation factors we show in
this section hold up to a small additive error.15
15 If the prices are increased by discrete δ increments, then the additive error is of order O(mnδ).
We begin by establishing that the Kelso-Crawford algorithm works well for the class of α-
submodular and -close to linear valuations, as studied above in Section 4. The proof of Theorem 5
appears in Section 5.3.
Theorem 5 (Linear). In a market with α-submodular valuations that are -close to linear valu-
ations, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm finds an allocation with 1α+2 -approximately optimal welfare
(up to a vanishing error).
The positive result in Theorem 5 does not extend even to -close to unit-demand (and still
α-submodular) valuations – see Proposition 8 in Appendix D.1 for a counter-example. We consider
instead the unweighted version of unit-demand valuations, and more generally the direct sums of
such valuations – called unweighted transversal valuations – for which we establish that Kelso-
Crawford maintains good welfare guarantees.
A valuation r is an unweighted unit-demand valuation if v(S) = maxj∈S r(j) for every bundle
S and r(j) ∈ {0, 1} for every item j. A valuation r is an unweighted transversal valuation if there
exists a partition P = (P1, . . . , Pk) of the items such that v(S) =
∑
P∈P maxj∈P r(j) for every
bundle S, and r(j) ∈ {0, 1} for every item j. An equivalent definition in terms of matchings in
graphs is the following: r is an unweighted transversal valuation if it can be represented by a
bipartite graph whose vertices on one side of the graph all have degree 1, and whose edges M have
{0, 1} edge weights. The value for a bundle of edges S is the weight of the maximum matching in
the bipartite graph induced by S. See Figure 1 for an example. Such valuations arise in natural
economic environments, e.g. in the context of labor markets.16
The proof of Theorem 6 appears in Section 5.3.
Fig. 1. A graphical representation of an unweighted transversal valuation r. The edges correspond to items and have
{0, 1} weights; they are partitioned in this case into two parts P1, P2. The value that r attributes to the subset of
solid bold edges in this example is 1, since this is the weight of the maximum-weight matching within the subset.
1
1
0 1
0
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Theorem 6 (Transversal). In a market with α-submodular valuations that are -close to un-
weighted transversal valuations, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm finds an allocation with 1
α(1+3)2
-
approximately optimal welfare (up to a vanishing error).
5.3 Proofs of Positive Results for Kelso-Crawford
The proofs of Theorems 5 and 6 follow directly from the welfare guarantee of a “biased” Walrasian
equilibrium (Definition 5 and Proposition 7), together with an appropriate lemma showing that
Kelso-Crawford converges to such an equilibrium (the lemma for Theorem 5 is Lemma 4 – see
Appendix C.2; the lemma for Theorem 6 is Lemma 5 – see Appendix C.3). We first describe
the idea of a “biased” equilibrium, and then give a high-level overview of how we analyze the
performance and convergence of the Kelso-Crawford algorithm.
16 Consider for example a firm wishing to hire a team of several workers, each with a different specialization, from a
pool of specialist workers who are each either acceptable to the firm or not.
Biased Walrasian equilibrium. Recall that the standard proof establishing the optimality (up to
a small error) of Kelso-Crawford for gross substitutes relies on showing convergence to a Walrasian
equilibrium. Unfortunately in our case it does not hold – even approximately – that Kelso-Crawford
allocates to each player a bundle in his demand. Instead, our proofs will define and utilize a different
notion of an approximate Walrasian equilibrium.
Definition 5. Consider a market with n players, and let µ ∈ [0, 1]. A full allocation S and a
price vector p form a µ-biased Walrasian equilibrium if there exists µ′ ∈ [µ, 1] such that for every
alternative allocation T and for every player i,
µ′
µ
vi(Si)− p(Si) ≥ µ′vi(Ti)− p(Ti). (5)
Proposition 7 (Approximate first welfare theorem.). The welfare of a µ-biased Walrasian
equilibrium is a µ-approximation to the optimal welfare.
Proof. Let S∗ be an optimal allocation. Without loss of generality we can assume that S∗ is a full
allocation. By summing up Inequality (5) over all players, we get (µ′/µ)W (S)− p(S) ≥ µ′W (S∗)−
p(S∗). Since both S,S∗ are full allocations, p(S) = p(S∗). We conclude that W (S) ≥ µOPT. uunionsq
A possible economic interpretation of a µ-biased Walrasian equilibrium is that its allocation and
prices induce market stability under the endowment effect (see, e.g., [20]). This effect is modeled
as an increase of factor µ′/µ in a player’s value for the bundle he owns, and a decrease of factor µ′
in his value for bundles he does not own.
Proof Idea To give intuition for the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5 (applied in order to prove Theorems
5 and 6, respectively), let us compare the case of linear valuations to that of -close to linear (and
α-submodular) valuations. The analysis of Kelso-Crawford for the linear case is simple – every
player ends up with the items for which he has the highest marginal value and can afford to pay
the highest price. In the close-to-linear case, an item could end up belonging to the wrong player
for two reasons: at some point, given his current allocation (which is subject to changes), either
(1) the right player has a low marginal value for the item, or (2) the wrong player has a high
marginal value for it. The latter issue is resolved by submodularity, but the former could drive
Kelso-Crawford to performance that is bounded away from optimal, as demonstrated in the bad
example in Appendix D.1. Thus the crux of the proofs is to show this cannot happen for the classes
of valuations in question.
For the close-to-linear case, we achieve this by considering the marginal value of all “under-
valued” items together, if we were to add them to the player’s final allocation (see proof of Lemma
4). The transversal case is more involved since we cannot analyze only the addition of items to the
player’s final allocation – we need to also consider swapping out items from the final allocation and
replacing them with others (see proof of Lemma 5).
6 Conclusions and Open Questions
Let us summarize the findings of this paper: The robustness of results for various classes of valua-
tions should not be assumed without further investigation. The default assumption should be that
positive results are not robust and may break down abruptly when small deviations from the class
in question are introduced. Robust results can be attained, but they are surprisingly challenging
to obtain even in simple cases. Most importantly, it matters how “closeness” to a class is defined,
and what the other attributes of the variant of the problem are (oracle model, class of valuations).
We wish to conclude by stating what we believe to be the main open problems in this area:
• Is it possible to obtain a (1−O())-approximation to optimal social welfare in the value oracle
model for submodular valuations that are -close to gross substitutes?
• Is it possible to obtain a (1 − O())-approximation to optimal social welfare in the demand
oracle model for (non-submodular) valuations -close to gross substitutes?
• Is there any other natural notion of being close to a gross substitutes valuation that captures
interesting examples and allows a (1−O())-approximation?
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APPENDIX
A Standard Algorithms for Welfare-Maximization
Algorithms 1 and 2 describe the ascending price and the greedy approaches to welfare maximization.
ALGORITHM 1: The Kelso-Crawford ascending-price auction (formulated as an algorithm)
Input: Player valuations v1, . . . , vn represented by demand oracles; a parameter δ > 0
Output: An allocation S and a price vector p
p := 0 and S := ∅; % Initialization
while there exists a player i and a non-empty bundle Di such that Di is in demand given prices p+ δ1j /∈Si and
current allocation Si, do
Si := Si ∪Di;
Si′ := Si′ \Di for every i′ 6= i;
p(j) := p(j) + δ for every j ∈ Di;
end
ALGORITHM 2: Greedy maximization of value subject to a feasibility constraint
Input: A valuation v represented by a value oracle; a feasibility constraint represented by a feasiblity oracle
Output: A bundle S
S := ∅; % Initialization
while there exists an item j /∈ S such that S ∪ {j} is feasible do
Let j∗ be an item that maximizes v(j∗ | S) among all items j /∈ S such that S ∪ {j} is feasible;
S := S ∪ {j∗};
end
B α-Submodularity
Observation 7 If a valuation v is α-submodular then it is marginal--close for  = α − 1 to the
class of decreasing functions.
Proof (Sketch). Fix an item j. We want to show that the set function v(j | ·) is -close to a decreasing
function gj . We define gj as follows. For every bundle S, there is a range [
1
1+v(j | S), v(j | S)] to
which gj(S) must belong. Furthermore, for gj to be decreasing, for every S and every subset T ⊆ S,
the upper-bound on the range of gj(T ) is also an upper-bound on the range of gj(S). We claim that:
(1) If there is a non-zero range for gj(S) for every bundle S, then by picking the highest value in the
range to be gj(S), we have defined a decreasing gj such that v(j | ·) is -close to it; (2) If there is a
bundle S with negative range then we have found a contradiction to α-submodularity of v. Indeed,
if this is the case then we have found a subset T such that v(j | T ) < v(j | S)/1 +  = v(j | S)/α.
This concludes the proof. uunionsq
Proof (of Observation 3). Define a linear valuation ` as follows: `(S) = (1−c)(v(∅)+∑|S|j=1 v(sj | ∅))
for every bundle S. Using that v has curvature c, v(S) = v(∅) +∑|S|j=1 v(sj |Sj) ≥ (1 − c)(v(∅) +∑|S|
j=1 v(sj |∅)) = `(S). Using that v is α-submodular, v(S) = v(∅) +
∑|S|
j=1 v(sj |Sj) ≤ v(∅) +
α
∑|S|
j=1 v(sj |∅) ≤ α1−c`(S). Thus v is -close to ` for  such that 1 +  = α1−c . uunionsq
Proof.
α
mX∑
j=1
v(xj | Yj) ≥
mX∑
j=1
v(xj | Z ∪Xj) (6)
= v(X | Z) (7)
≤ `(X | Z)− `(Z), (8)
where (6) follows since Yj ⊆ Z ∪Xj and since v is α-submodular, (7) follows by the disjointness of
X and Z, and (8) follows since v is -close to ` and by Observation 1. uunionsq
C Proofs for Kelso-Crawford
In this appendix we present several results and missing proofs related to the Kelso-Crawford algo-
rithm.
C.1 Kelso-Crawford and α-Submodular Valuations
We generalize a well-known invariant of Kelso-Crawford for submodular valuations [16] to α-
submodular valuations. This lemma will be used in the next sections to prove Lemmas 4 and 5.
Definition 6. Let v be a valuation and p be a price vector. A bundle S is α-IR (α-individually
rational) for v given p if αv(S) ≥ p(S). A bundle S is strongly α-IR for v given p if αv(T ) ≥ p(T )
for every T ⊆ S.
Lemma 3. Consider a market with a player whose valuation v is α-submodular. Then the Kelso-
Crawford algorithm maintains the following invariant: the player’s allocation throughout the algo-
rithm is strongly α-IR.
Proof. Since removing items from the player’s allocation maintains the strong α-IR property, the
only case we need to check is when a bundle T is added to the player’s current allocation S. We
know that T maximizes the player’s utility given S and the current price vector p. We show this by
induction. In the base case all prices are 0 and so the invariant holds. Now assume for contradiction
that S ∪ T is not strongly α-IR, i.e., there exists a set S′ ∪ T ′ where S′ ⊆ S and T ′ ⊆ T such that
αv(S′ ∪ T ′) < p(S′) + p(T ′). By the induction assumption, αv(S′) ≥ p(S′), and so it must be the
case that αv(T ′ | S′) < p(T ′). So using α-submodularity we can write the utility v(T | S)− p(T ) as
v(T \T ′ | S)+v(T ′ | S∪T \T ′)−p(T \T ′)−p(T ′) ≤ v(T \T ′ | S)+αv(T ′ | S′)−p(T \T ′)−p(T ′) <
v(T \ T ′ | S) − p(T \ T ′). Thus adding T \ T ′ to S adds more to the utility than adding T to S,
contradiction. uunionsq
A corollary of Lemma 3 that generalizes a result of [16] is the following.
Corollary 3. In a market with α-submodular valuations, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm finds an
allocation with (1 + α)-approximately optimal welfare (up to a vanishing error).
C.2 Kelso-Crawford and Close to Linear Valuations
Lemma 4. In a market with α-submodular valuations v1, . . . , vn that are -close to linear valuations
r1, . . . , rn, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm converges to a
1
α+2 -biased Walrasian equilibrium.
Proof. As in the proof of Theorem 6, we can assume without loss of generality that Kelso-Crawford
returns a full allocation. From now until the end of the proof, fix a player i. Let Si be player i’s
allocation and let p be the price vector at termination of the KC algorithm. Let Ti be an alternative
bundle for player i. We show that
vi(Si)− p(Si) ≥ vi(Ti)− p(Ti)− (2+ α− 1) vi(Si). (9)
This is sufficient to complete the proof, since by summing up over all players and rearranging, we
get
(2+ α)
∑
i
vi(Si)−
∑
i
p(Si) ≥
∑
i
vi(Ti)−
∑
i
p(Ti),
and so µ ≥ 1/(α+ 2).
It remains to prove Inequality (9). For simplicity we omit i from the notation. Without loss of
generality, assume that in the last round of Kelso-Crawford, the player added to his existing bundle,
which we denote by B, a bundle which maximizes his utility given B and given the price vector
p. So the player’s utility at termination vi(Si) − p(Si) is at least up(B ∪ T ). We use the notation
B′ = B \ T , T ′ = T \B, and C = B ∩ T . We can now write the lower bound on the player’s utility
as
up(B ∪ T ) = v(∅) + v(B′ | ∅) + v(C | B′) + v(T ′ | B)− p(B′)− p(C)− p(T ′). (10)
By Lemma 3, B is α-strongly IR. So
v(B′ | ∅) + (α− 1)v(B′ | ∅) ≥ p(B′). (11)
By Observation 1,
v(C | B′) ≥
∑
j∈C
`(j)− v(B). (12)
Again by Observation 1,
v(T ′ | B) ≥
∑
j∈T ′
`(j)− v(B). (13)
Plugging Inequalities (11)-(13) into (10) and using v’s -closeness to ` we get
up(B ∪ T ) ≥ c− (α− 1)v(B′ | ∅) +
∑
j∈T
`(j)− p(T )− 2v(B)
≥ `(T )− p(T )− (2+ α− 1) v(B).
Inequality (9) follows, and this completes the proof. uunionsq
C.3 Kelso-Crawford and Close to Transversal Valuations
Lemma 5. In a market with α-submodular valuations v1, . . . , vn that are -close to unweighted
transversal valuations r1, . . . , rn, the Kelso-Crawford algorithm converges to a
1
α(1+3)2
-biased Wal-
rasian equilibrium.
Proof. By monotonicity we can assume without loss of generality that all items are allocated at price
0 in the first step of the Kelso-Crawford algorithm, and once an item is allocated then it remains
allocated throughout. Thus without loss of generality, Kelso-Crawford returns a full allocation as
required by the definition of a µ-biased Walrasian equilibrium.
From now until the end of the proof, fix a player i. For simplicity we omit i from the notation.
Let P = (P1, . . . , Pk) be the partition of the items corresponding to the unweighted transversal
valuation r, to which the player’s valuation v is -close. For an item j, let P (j) denote the part to
which this item belongs. We say that a part P is represented in a bundle X if X contains at least
one item j ∈ P with value r(j) = 1.
Towards proving the guarantee in Inequality (5), let S be the bundle allocated to the player by
the Kelso-Crawford algorithm, and let T be an alternative bundle. Let P (S) (resp., P (T )) be the
parts represented in S (resp., T ). Let S′ = {j ∈ S | P (j) ∈ P (S)∩P (T )} be the set of items in S that
belong to parts represented both in S and in T , and similarly T ′ = {j ∈ T | P (j) ∈ P (S) ∩ P (T )}.
Claim 8 r(S′) = r(T ′).
Proof (of Claim 8). The value assigned to a set by valuation r is the number of parts represented
in it. By definition, the same parts are represented in S′ and in T ′. uunionsq
We now relate the prices of S′ and T ′ according to the price vector p with which the Kelso-
Crawford algorithm terminated. In particular we show that the price of S′ cannot be too high in
comparison to the price of T ′.
Claim 9 p(S′) ≤ p(T ′) + 3αr(S′).
The proof of Claim 9 appears below. We use the above claims to complete the proof of Lemma
5. Let S′′ = S \S′ and T ′′ = T \T ′. We know that when the Kelso-Crawford algorithm terminates,
the player cannot improve his utility by adding T ′′ to his allocation S, and so:
v(S)− p(S) ≥ v(S ∪ T ′′)− p(S ∪ T ′′)
= v(S′′) + v(S′ | S′′) + v(T ′′ | S)− p(S′′)− p(S′)− p(T ′′). (14)
By α-submodularity Lemma 3 applies and S′′ is α-IR, therefore
v(S′′)− p(S′′) ≥ (1− α)v(S′′). (15)
The marginal value assigned by r to a bundle X given a bundle Y is the number of parts represented
in X but not in Y . Therefore r(S′ | S′′) = r(S′) and r(T ′′ | S) = r(T ′′). By Observation 1 and since
r(S′) = r(T ′) (Claim 8),
v(S′ | S′′) ≥ r(S′ | S′′)− r(S′′) ≥ r(S′)− r(S) = r(T ′)− r(S); (16)
v(T ′′ | S) ≥ r(T ′′ | S)− r(S) = r(T ′′)− r(S). (17)
Plugging (15)-(17) into (14), and using that r(T ′) + r(T ′′) = r(T ) and p(S′) ≤ p(T ′) + 3αr(S′)
(Claim 9),
v(S)− p(S) ≥ (1− α)v(S′′) + r(T )− 2r(S)− p(T )− 3αr(S′)
≥ 1
1 + 
v(T )− p(T )− (α− 1 + 2+ 3α)v(S),
where the last inequality uses v’s -closeness to r. Thus µ ≥ ((1+)(α+2+3α))−1 ≥ (α(1+3)2)−1.
This completes the proof of Lemma 5. uunionsq
Towards proving Claim 9, the following is a property of valuations that are α-submodular and
-close to unweighted transversal valuations. It can be seen as a strengthening of Observation 1.
Claim 10 For every part P and bundles X ⊆ P and Y , if P is represented in Y then v(X | Y ) ≤
α.
Proof. Let y be an item representing P in Y . Then by α-submodularity, v(X | Y ) ≤ αv(X | y) ≤
αr(X | y) + αr(X ∪ {y}) = α, where the last inequality is by invoking Observation 1. uunionsq
Proof (of Claim 9). Fix a part P that is represented in S′ and T ′. Let t be an item representing
P in T ′. Order the items representing P in S′ according to the order in which the Kelso-Crawford
algorithm added them to the player’s allocation for the last time (i.e., at their termination prices
according to p), breaking ties arbitrarily; denote the ordered set by (s1, s2, . . . ). Let Bj be the
bundle of the player right before item sj was added, and let Dj be the set of items (not including
sj) with which sj was added to Bj .
We first consider item s1. If it is the case that P is not represented in B1 and no other item
represents P in D1, then we argue that v(s1 | B1 ∪D1)− p(s1) ≥ v(t | B1 ∪D1)− p(t). The reason
for this is that otherwise, the player’s utility could have been improved by replacing s1 by t (using
that t’s termination price p(t) is weakly higher than its price when s1 was added). By monotonicity,
we can write v(s1 | B1 ∪D1) ≤ v(s1, t | B1 ∪D1) ≤ v(t | B1 ∪D1) + α, where the last inequality
is by Claim 10. Therefore p(s1) ≤ p(t) + α. In the remaining case, P is represented in either B1
or D1. We know that v(s1 | B1 ∪D1) ≥ p(s1), otherwise the utility could have been improved by
dropping s1. By Claim 10, the left-hand side is at most α, and so p(s1) ≤ α.
Now consider the rest of the items s2, s3, . . . . When item sj is added, {s1, . . . , sj−1} ⊆ Bj ∪Dj .
We also know that, as above, v(sj | Bj ∪ Dj) ≥ p(sj). By α-submodularity this means that
α
∑
j≥2 v(sj | Sj) ≥
∑
j≥2 p(sj). The left-hand side is equal to αv({s2, s3, . . . } | s1), and is therefore
≤ α by Observation 1. We have thus shown that ∑j≥2 p(sj) ≤ α, and the same argument shows
that the total payment for items in S′ ∩ P that do not represent P is at most α.
We conclude that the total payment for items in S′ ∩P is at most p(t) + 3α. Summing up over
all parts represented in S′ and T ′ completes the proof of the claim. uunionsq
D Negative Results for Specific Algorithms
How well do standard algorithms for welfare maximization perform for valuations that are close to,
but are not quite, gross substitutes? After discussing the LP-based approach in Section 3.2, in this
section we discuss the two other main approaches to welfare maximization for gross substitutes –
the ascending auction algorithm of Kelso and Crawford [22], and the cycle canceling algorithm of
Murota [30,31].
At first glance the Kelso-Crawford algorithm seems like a promising approach due to its known
welfare guarantee of a 1/2-approximation for the class of submodular valuations [16]. However
Section D.1 shows that the Kelso-Crawford algorithm cannot in general guarantee much better
than that even for simple submodular valuations that are arbitrarily close to unit-demand. An
interesting open question is whether the Kelso-Crawford algorithm can be modified to eliminate
such bad examples, e.g., by ordering the players in an optimal way.
The cycle canceling algorithm of Murota is a different approach which relies on properties of GS
(or equivalently M \-concave) valuations under local improvements. In Section D.2 we show that
such properties hold for submodular valuations in a certain approximate sense, but unfortunately
the cycle canceling algorithm cannot find a local optimum that would allow us to exploit these
properties. In fact we show that a local optimum in Murota’s sense does not exist for submodular
valuations.
D.1 A Negative Result for Kelso-Crawford
Proposition 8. For every  ≤ 1, there exists a market with O(1/) players whose submodular
valuations are -close to unit-demand, for which the Kelso-Crawford algorithm with adversarial
ordering of the players finds an allocation with ≈ 2/3 of the optimal welfare.
Proof. Let ρ = 1+ . Let H be a large constant, and set n
′ = H/ρ. Let δ be negligibly small.
There are three kinds of items on the market: one “large” item h, n′ items x1, . . . , xn′ , and n′
items y1, . . . , yn′ . There are four kinds of players: n
′ main players, two h-players who have unit-
demand valuations for the item h, 2n′ x-players who have unit-demand valuations for one of the x’s,
and 2n′ y-players who have unit-demand valuations for one of the y’s. In particular, the h-players
value item h at H, each xj has a pair of x-players who value it at ρH − δ, and each yj has a pair
of y-players who value it at ρH. Denote by vi the valuation of the ith main player, and by ri the
unit-demand valuation to which it is -close. Table 1 compares vi and ri for the items to which they
attribute non-zero value (all other items have value 0). The proof of the next claim appears below.
Claim 11 The valuation vi is submodular.
We now describe how the Kelso-Crawford algorithm can go wrong. First, the x-players and
y-players raise the price of every item xj to ρH − δ and of every item yj to ρH. The price of h
remains 0 at this point. It is now the turn of the first main player. His utilities for the relevant
Table 1. The valuation vi of the ith main player, and the unit-demand valuation ri to which it is -close.
{} {h} {xi} {yi} {h, xi} {h, yi} {xi, yi} {h, xi, yi}
vi 0
H
1+
ρH 2ρH H H 2ρH H
ri 0
H
1+
ρH
1+
2ρH
1+
H
1+
H
1+
2ρH
1+
H
1+
bundles are described in Table 2. The first main player chooses {h, x1} as the unique bundle that
maximizes his utility, and the prices of items h and x1 slightly increase. Now the second main player
chooses {h, x2} as the bundle that maximizes his utility, taking h away from the first main player
(the price of h has increased, but if the price increments are small enough – of order O() – then it
is still the unique utility-maximizing bundle for the second main player). This repeats for the third
main player and so on. After all the main players have chosen bundles in this way, the h-players
raise the price of item h to H. At this point, no player wants to add to his current bundle: For
the main players, h is now too expensive, and since for every i the ith main player has {xi} as his
bundle, the marginal value of yi for him is equal to yi’s price ρH. For the x-players, the x items
have become too expensive. For the y-players and the h-players, the y and h items have prices equal
to their values, respectively. Thus the Kelso-Crawford algorithm terminates.
Table 2. The 1st main player’s utilities for different bundles after the prices of the x and y items were raised (the
raised prices appear in the first row).
{} {h} {x1} {y1} {h, x1} {h, y1} {x1, y1} {h, x1, y1}
p 0 0 ρH − δ ρH ρH − δ ρH 2ρH − δ 2ρH − δ
v1 − p 0 H1+ δ H1+ H1+ + δ H1+ δ (1−)H1+ + δ
Consider the welfare at termination. The main players contribute n′ρH to the welfare, the y-
players also contribute n′ρH and h-players contribute H. Alternatively, if the main players were to
take the y items, the x-players were to take the x items and the h-players would keep the h item,
the welfare would have been 2n′ρH +n′ρH +H and this is optimal. The ratio between the welfare
achieved by Kelso-Crawford and OPT is therefore ≈ 34 , and this completes the proof. uunionsq
Proof (of Claim 11). The valuation vi attributes non-zero values to three items: h, xi and yi. Table
1 shows vi’s monotonicity. To see its submodularity, consider Table 3, which shows the marginals
of the three items (one row per item) given combinations of the other two items. Note that adding
any other items on the market does not change these marginals. We can see that the marginals for
every item are indeed decreasing, concluding the proof. uunionsq
Table 3. The marginal values of valuation vi for items h, xi, yi.
h vi(h) = vi(h | xi) = vi(h | yi) = vi(h | xi, yi) =
H
1+
= (1− ρ)H (1− ρ)H (1− 2ρ)H (1− 2ρ)H
xi vi(xi) = vi(xi | h) = vi(xi | yi) = vi(xi | h, yi) =
ρH ρH 0 0
yi vi(yi) = vi(yi | h) = vi(yi | xi) = vi(yi | h, xi) =
2ρH ρH ρH 0
D.2 Murota’s Cycle Canceling Approach
The cycle canceling approach is based on the following useful property of gross substitutes val-
uations, called the single improvement (SI) property [17]: Given a price vector p, we say that a
bundle S is in local demand for a valuation v if its utility cannot be improved by adding an item,
removing an item or swapping one item for another. The SI property holds if every bundle S in local
demand is also in (global) demand (i.e., v(S)− p(S) ≥ v(T )− p(T ) for every bundle T ). Murota’s
cycle canceling algorithm finds an allocation and prices such that each player gets a bundle in local
demand, thus arriving at an optimal allocation for gross substitutes valuations.
We observe that a variant of the SI property characterizes submodular valuations, and thus the
SI property interpolates between submodularity and gross substitutes.
Definition 7. Let β ∈ [0, 1]. A valuation v is β-SI if for every S in local demand, S is strongly
individually rational,17 and v(S)− βp(S) ≥ v(T )− p(T ) for every T .
Observation 12 A monotone valuation is submodular if and only if it is 0-SI. A monotone valu-
ation is gross substitutes if and only if it is 1-SI.
Proof. Suppose v is submodular; we want to prove that v is 0-SI. Let S be in local demand,
v(S + i) − v(S) ≤ pi, and v(S − j) − v(S) ≤ −pj . (We don’t even need the swap property.)
By submodularity and the second property, we have v(S ∪ T ) ≤ v(S) + ∑i∈T\S pi. Therefore,
v(S) ≥ v(S∪T )−p(T \S) ≥ v(T )−p(T ) by monotonicity. Also, for every S′ ⊂ S, by submodularity
we have v(S \ S′) ≤ v(S)−∑j∈S′ pj . Therefore v(S′) ≥ v(S)− v(S \ S′) ≥ p(S′).
Conversely, suppose that v is not submodular, i.e. v(S+a+b) > v(S)+v(a | S)+v(b | S) for some
S and a, b /∈ S. We set pi = 0 for i ∈ S and pj = v(j | S) for j /∈ S. Clearly S is in local demand,
because swapping at most 1 element does not increase utility. However, v(S∪{a, b})−p(S∪{a, b}) >
v(S), so v is not 0-SI. uunionsq
Moreover, as the next observation shows, finding an allocation with prices such that each player
gets a bundle in their local demand would give a smooth transition would provide a smooth tran-
sition between a 1/2-approximation for submodular valuations and an optimal solution for gross
substitutes.
Observation 13 For β-SI valuations, any allocation (of all items) with prices such that each player
gets a bundle in their local demand has value at least 12−βOPT .
17 Being strongly IR implicitly holds for SI as well, i.e., if v is SI and S is in local demand then S is strongly IR.
Proof. Suppose that each vi is β-SI and we have an allocation (A1, . . . , An) with prices such that
each Ai is in the local demand of player i. We assume that all items are allocated, and the allocation
is individually rational; therefore,
∑n
i=1 vi(Ai) ≥
∑n
i=1 p(Ai) =
∑
pj .
Suppose that the optimal allocation is (O1, . . . , On). By the β-SI property, we have vi(Ai) −
βp(Ai) ≥ vi(Oi)−p(Oi). Adding up over all players,
∑n
i=1 vi(Ai)−β
∑
pj ≥ OPT−
∑
pj . From here,∑n
i=1 vi(Ai) ≥ OPT −(1−β)
∑
pj ≥ OPT −(1−β)
∑n
i=1 vi(Ai). Thus (2−β)
∑n
i=1 vi(Ai) ≥ OPT .
uunionsq
Unfortunately, this approach (whether by cycle canceling or by any other method) is doomed
to fail: Example 1 demonstrates that there are markets with submodular valuations for which it is
impossible to find an allocation and prices such that every player’s bundle is in their local demand.
In other words, it is impossible to get rid of all negative cycles in Murota’s algorithm.
Example 1. We consider 2 players, 4 items, and submodular (coverage) valuations defined as follows:
v1(S) = w(
⋃
i∈S Ai), where the weights of the regions in the Venn diagram of A1, A2, A3, A4 are
depicted in Figure 2;  > 0 here is a small constant. We also define v2(S) = w(
⋃
i∈S Bi) where
B1 = A4, B2 = A1, B3 = A2, B4 = A3.
The claim is that the optimal allocation is S1 = {1, 3} for player 1, and S2 = {2, 4} for player
2, which has welfare 16. However, given this allocation there is a negative cycle in Murota’s sense:
• Player 1 swaps item 1 for item 2;
• Player 2 swaps item 2 for item 3;
• Player 1 swaps item 3 for item 4;
• Player 2 swaps item 4 for item 1.
Each exchange alone brings an improvement in value, from 8 to 8 +  for each player, and thus is
represented by a negative edge in Murota’s graph. However, performing all the exchanges in a cycle
decreases the value from 16 to 8 + 4.
For other allocations, it is even easier to see that there is a negative cycle: The reader can check
that for every other allocation (which is suboptimal), there is a swap of items that improves the
solution. Hence this swap corresponds to a negative cycle.
It follows that for every allocation there is a negative cycle in Murota’s graph. Equivalently,
for any assignment of prices, there exists a local swap that improves some player’s utility. (Prices
without an improving swap exist if and only if there is no negative cycle in Murota’s graph; see
[34].) In other words, we cannot arrange for all players to have a bundle in their local demand.
One might object that these coverage valuations are not close to gross substitutes. However, one
can easily achieve this by adding a linear function with large coefficients; the resulting valuation is
close to linear, and the same conclusion still holds — we cannot get rid of negative cycles.
We remark that [26] discuss the issue of non-improving negative cycles, and present a heuristic
modification of their algorithm for submodular valuations. However, as far as we see, they do not
address the question whether a solution without negative cycles could be found by some other ap-
proach. Our example shows that it is indeed impossible to eliminate negative cycles for submodular
valuations.
Fig. 2. Coverage valuation for a counterexample to cycle canceling.
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